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Linear constraints occur naturally in many reasoning problems and the information that they represent is often uncer-
tain. There is a diﬃculty in applying AI uncertainty formalisms to this situation, as their representation of the underlying
logic, either as a mutually exclusive and exhaustive set of possibilities, or with a propositional or a predicate logic, is inap-
propriate (or at least unhelpful). To overcome this diﬃculty, we express reasoning with linear constraints as a logic, and
develop the formalisms based on this diﬀerent underlying logic. We focus in particular on a possibilistic logic representa-
tion of uncertain linear constraints, a lattice-valued possibilistic logic, an assumption-based reasoning formalism and a
Dempster–Shafer representation, proving some fundamental results for these extended systems. Our results on extending
uncertainty formalisms also apply to a very general class of underlying monotonic logics.
 2007 Published by Elsevier Inc.
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Spatial and temporal reasoning1. Introduction
Many reasoning problems involve linear constraints restricting the possible values of real-valued variables;
in particular temporal and spatial problems can involve linear constraints representing relationships between
temporal variables and between spatial variables, see e.g., [16,26,7]. Such constraints can often represent infor-
mation that is uncertain. Many formalisms for representing and reasoning with uncertain information have
been developed. The underlying logical information is typically expressed as a ﬁnite set of possibilities, or
using propositional calculus, or sometimes ﬁrst order predicate calculus. One can sometimes convert linear
constraints to a discrete (e.g., propositional) form, but this can make the representation very cumbersome,
and the important metric information will tend to be hidden. Furthermore, discrete representations cannot
take the continuous nature of space and time into account, for which it can be natural to have continuously
graded representations of uncertainty. For example, based on diﬀerent sets of map data, we may have (for
example, in a Dempster–Shafer representation) a degree of belief of 0.8 that a well is more than 5 m from0888-613X/$ - see front matter  2007 Published by Elsevier Inc.
doi:10.1016/j.ijar.2007.08.007
q This paper is an extended version of [34].
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84 N. Wilson / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 49 (2008) 83–98a property boundary, and a degree of belief of 0.7 that it is more than 8 m away. The degree of belief that it is
more than 7 m from the boundary will tend to be more than 0.7 and less than 0.8; in fact, the degree of belief
may well vary continuously with the distance from the boundary.
It can therefore be preferable and more natural to represent linear constraints (and more general kinds of
constraint) directly, and extend the uncertainty theories to reason with these. We approach this problem by
expressing linear constraints in a logic (Section 2.1) and generalising uncertainty formalisms by deﬁning them
over this logic. These are illustrated in terms of a simple example, based on a real application of reasoning with
uncertain geographic information. Our approach to generalising uncertainty formalisms applies for a very
general class of underlying logics, which we deﬁne formally in Section 2.2; this includes logics which can rea-
son with disjunctions of linear constraints, or even non-linear constraints, allowing, for example, more expres-
sive representations of spatial boundaries.
The basic idea behind the generalisation of uncertainty formalisms is to consider the uncertainty theories
over (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) sets of possibilities, and associate a constraint with its semantics. For example, suppose
that c is a constraint on a set of real-valued variables, and let [c] be the set of all assignments that satisfy the
constraint c. Then (for example) the degree of belief of c is deﬁned to be the degree of belief of the set [c]. This
kind of approach can be used to extend logic-based formalisms, such as various non-monotonic logics and
belief revision formalisms. In this paper we focus on formalisms which involve some kind of grade or degree
of support being allocated to propositions. The grades of support may be totally ordered: as in Dempster–
Shafer beliefs, or necessity values in possibility theory and possibilistic logic; or only partially ordered as in
lattice-valued possibilistic logic and the generalised assumption-based reasoning formalism. Partially ordered
degrees of support can be natural, for example, when one has information from two sources, and we do not
know which of the sources is more reliable. The degrees of belief are interpreted probabilistically in Dempster–
Shafer theory, and more qualitatively in the other formalisms considered, where the grades may just represent
ordering information amongst strengths of belief.
We consider possibilistic logic in Section 3, where we show (Theorem 2) how deduction in the possibilistic
logic can be achieved using deduction in the underlying logic. In Section 4 we generate a system of lattice-val-
ued possibilistic logic, based on linear constraints or other underlying monotonic logics; in a similar way we
generate a generalised assumption-based reasoning formalism. For each of these we give a sound and complete
proof theory. In Section 5 we show how one can extend Dempster–Shafer theory.
2. Underlying monotonic logics
In this section we deﬁne the underlying logics for the generalised uncertainty formalisms constructed in Sec-
tions 3–5. First we consider a logic of linear constraints. Then, in Section 2.2 we consider a general class of
monotonic logics.
2.1. A logic of linear constraints
We describe, in this section, a logical representation of linearP-constraints, with a semantics and a proof
theory that is sound and complete for ﬁnite sets of constraints. We consider linear constraints of the following
form: a1x1 +    + anxnP a0, where a0, . . . ,an are known real numbers, and x1, . . . ,xn are unknown real num-
bers, often representing some physical quantities that we are interested in, but only have partial information
about. This constraint is saying that the unknown vector x = (x1, . . . ,xn) must be such that
a1x1 +    + anxnP a0 holds.
2.1.1. The language
Let V = {X1, . . . ,Xn} be a ﬁnite set of real-valued variables.
1 We are interested in linear constraints on V of
the form a1X1 +    + anXnP a0. Formally we deﬁne a (linear) constraint a to be a real-valued function on
{0, . . . ,n}, where a(i) is usually written ai. Let L be the set of all such (linear) constraints. Deﬁne a model1 Each variable is assumed to have a true, but (usually) unknown, value. We do not consider here the more complex case where some of
the variables are decision variables, as studied in e.g., simple temporal problems under uncertainty [30].
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iable Xi. Let M be the set of all models. We say that model x satisﬁes a, written x  a, if and only if
a1x1 +    + anxnP a0.
Element a of L represents the inequality:
Pn
i¼1aiX i P a0. We will usually slightly abuse the notation
and write elements of L as linear inequalities
Pn
i¼1aixi P a0, or some equivalent form such asP
i  aixi 6 a0.
We label three special constraints as >, >0 and ?, which are deﬁned as follows: for each i 2 {1, . . . ,n},
>(i) = >0(i) = ?(i) = 0, and >(0) =  1, >0(0) = 0 and ?(0) = 1. Thus > can be considered as the constraint
0P  1, >0 as 0P 0 and ? as 0P 1. > and >0 are satisﬁed by every model x, and ? is satisﬁed by none.
Constraints can be added, and multiplied by real-valued scalars: for constraints a,b and real number r, con-
straint a + b is deﬁned by (a + b)i = ai + bi for all i, and ra is deﬁned by (ra)i = rai for all i.
The language can also be used to represent constraints with 6 replacing P, and also linear equalities. A
constraint a1x1 +    + anxn 6 a0 can be written as (a1)x1 +    + (an)xnP  a0, so is equivalent to the
constraint a. (x satisﬁes the former constraint if and only if it satisﬁes a.) The linear equality
a1x1 +    + anxn = a0 holds if and only if both a1x1 +    + anxnP a0 and a1x1 +    + anxn 6 a0 hold so is
equivalent to the pair of constraints {a,a}. We could also easily extend the language to include strict con-
straints of the form a1x1 +    + anxn > a0 though, to keep the language simpler, we do not do so here.
Here are a few examples of constraints that can be represented using this language: (1) x1P 5.2; (2)
x1 6 x2; (3) x2 = x1  x3; (4) x1  2x2 6 x3 + 3x4; (5) x1/(x1 + x2 + x3) 2 [0.5,0.6]; (6) the absolute value of
x1  x2 is not more than 5; (7) the arithmetic mean of x1, x2 and x3 is 4.3.
2.1.2. Consistency and semantic consequence
Suppose we have a set A of constraints on unknown x. We say, in the usual way, that x satisﬁes A (written
x  A) if and only if x satisﬁes every member of A, i.e., x  a for all a 2 A. Let [A] be the set of x 2M that
satisfy A, i.e., ½A ¼ fx 2M : x  Ag. A is said to be consistent if it has a model, i.e., if [A] is non-empty; other-
wise it is said to be inconsistent. We would like to be able to talk about what constraints b necessarily follow
from those in A. Formally we deﬁne semantic consequence relation  by A  B if and only if every element b of
B is satisﬁed by every model of A, i.e., [A]  [B]. Set of constraints A is inconsistent if and only if A  {?}, since
? has no model. By its construction, semantic consequence  is a reﬂexive, transitive and hence monotonic
consequence relation. However, it is not compact; for example, if ak is the constraint x1P k then
A = {ak : k = 1,2 . . .} is inconsistent, but every ﬁnite subset of A is consistent.
2.1.3. Syntactic consequence
Consider the proof theory generated by the axioms > and >0 and inference rule schemas (where a and b are
arbitrary elements of L):
For any real r > 0, From a deduce ra.
From a and b deduce a + b.
For any constraint a, From ? deduce a.
For set of constraints A and constraint b we say in the usual way that b can be proved from A, written
A ‘ b, if b can be derived from applying iteratively the above inference rules to A and the axioms > and
>0; deﬁne also A ‘ B if A ‘ b for all b 2 B.
Any such (ﬁnitary) syntactic consequence relation ‘ is compact by deﬁnition, so we can not hope for full
completeness, as  is not compact. However, we have, by well-known fundamental results for linear program-
ming (see e.g., Chapter 1 of [29]) the following result (see [33]).
Theorem 1 (Finite completeness). For any sets of constraints A and B, A ‘ B implies A  B. If furthermore, A is
finite then A ‘ B () A  B.
In practice, one will use more developed tools for ﬁnding the consequences of a set of such constraints: for
general problems, linear programming techniques; for particular sparse systems, Fourier elimination can be
eﬃcient; or fast algorithms for special kinds of constraints, such as simple temporal networks [7].
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non-monotonic) extensions of classical logics to linear constraints. The logic described above is closely related
to the logic of probability described in [36] the main diﬀerence being that the latter has some additional axi-
oms, because of models being probability functions which are non-negative. The methods for producing non-
monotonic extensions to this logic of probability can be adapted to produce non-monotonic logics of linear
constraints. In particular, the deﬁnition of a default logic of probability in [36] (related to Reiter’s default logic
[25]) carries over immediately to a default logic of (ﬁnite sets of) linear constraints; this involves defaults of the
form A : B/C for ﬁnite subsets A, B, and C of L, which is intended to represent that one should deduce C if
one knows A, given that B is consistent with what is known.
2.1.4. Flooded river example
We illustrate the techniques using an example, which is based on a real application studied by Damien
Raclot and Christian Puech [23,24] (see also other work, from the REVIGIS project, on this topic:
[37,15,17,2]). An area of land surrounding a ﬂooded river is analysed using aerial photographs and other
sources of information, such as elevation models. It is divided up into n parcels of land, or compartments,
which are small enough so that it can be assumed that the water level is constant within a compartment. Each
of these compartments is either partially or completely ﬂooded. Let xi be the water level (in decimetres above a
ﬁxed base level) of compartment i.
The purpose of the analysis is to deduce information about the levels xi for various compartments i. Expert
analysis of the aerial photographs, in conjunction with the other sources of information, generates constraints
of the following forms: upper bounds of the form xi 6 s, and lower bounds of the form: xiP r (where r and s are
given numbers) and simple linear constraints of the form xjP xi, which we call a ﬂow, since it corresponds to a
ﬂow of water from compartment j down to compartment i, which is observable in the photograph. For exam-
ple, a lower bound can arise from knowledge of the elevation of a ﬂooded compartment, and an upper bound
through an observation that a vine is partially submerged. Both types of information (bounds and ﬂows) are
uncertain, but the ﬂows are considered as less uncertain than the bounds.
Ignoring the uncertainty, this is a special kind of simple temporal problem [7] (though the variables are
spatial rather than temporal, and the variables are state variables as opposed to decision variables); a sim-
ple linear time algorithm can be used involving both upstream and downstream propagations [24,33], to
test consistency and generate inferred bounds on the variables. However, this is not so useful on its
own since the input information in the application may well be inconsistent, because e.g., of mis-estimation
of elevations.
2.2. A general class of monotonic logics
The initial motivation of this work was to extend various uncertainty formalisms to linear constraints.
However, our approaches in Sections 3–5 apply to much more general logics, which we refer to here as ‘‘mono-
tonic model-theoretic logics’’. These include many classical logics, and also logics which allow disjunctions,
negations and conjunctions of linear constraints, as well as non-linear constraints. In particular, allowing dis-
junctions of linear constraints [20] greatly increases the expressive power, for example, allowing disjunctive
temporal problems to be represented [7], or allowing non-convex spatial polygons.
Formally, we deﬁne a monotonic model-theoretic logic to be a triple hL;M;i, where L andM are sets
and ML is a relation between them.L is called the language andM is called the set of models. Rela-
tion  is used to build a semantic entailment relation (which is also called ) between subsets of the language.
We use similar deﬁnitions as those in Section 2.1 for this more general situation. For model x 2M and a 2L
we say that x satisﬁes a if x  a (i.e., if (x,a) 2 ). For A L we say that x satisﬁes A, written x  A, if x
satisﬁes every element of A. For subsets A and B of the language L we say that A  B if x satisﬁes (every
element of) B for any model x which satisﬁes A. If b 2L we sometimes write A  b to mean A  {b}. For
A L we write [A] for the set of models that satisfy A, i.e., fx 2M : x  Ag. Hence A  B if and only if
[A]  [B]. We say that A is consistent if it has a model, i.e., if [A] is non-empty; otherwise A is inconsistent.
The relation  between subsets of the language is reﬂexive, monotonic and transitive. Speciﬁcally, if
A0  A L then A  A 0. If A 0  B and A 0  A then A  B. And, if A  B and B  C then A  C.
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restrictive assumption, since ifL does not contain such an element, we can add one toL.) Then, A (L) is
inconsistent if and only if A  ?.
3. Extending possibilistic logic
In this section it is shown how possibilistic logic [10,12] can be extended to deal with linear constraints, and
the other more general logics we are considering. In possibility theory [11], degrees of certainty—which are
called ‘necessity’—are assumed to be totally ordered and representable by numbers in [0,1]; a necessity value
of 1, for a proposition, means that the proposition is considered completely certain; a value of 0 means no
certainty at all. If the necessity of a is greater than the necessity of b, then a is considered to be better sup-
ported by our information than b is. Possibilistic logic involves reasoning about the degrees of necessity of
diﬀerent propositions of interest. In (standard) possibilistic logic, the lower bound of the necessity value of
each of a set of propositions is given; from these we wish to deduce the implied (lower bounds for) necessity
values of further propositions of interest. For more details about possibilistic logic, see [10,14,21,12] and other
papers referenced in the survey [12].
3.1. Possibility distributions, measures and necessity measures
Let X be a (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) set, representing a mutually exclusive and exhaustive set of possibilities. A pos-
sibility distribution on X is deﬁned to be a function p : X! [0, 1]. The associated possibility measure Possp :
2X! [0,1] is given by Possp(X) = sup{p(x) : x 2 X}. The associated necessity measure Necp : 2X! [0,1] is
given by Necp(X) = 1  Possp(X  X). This is intended to represent degrees of support for subsets of X. Note
that we are considering unnormalised possibility distributions, possibility measures and necessity measures,
i.e., we are not assuming that supx2Xp(x) = 1, or Poss(X) = 1 or that Nec(;) = 0.
3.2. Possibility measures and necessity measures on logical language L
We consider any monotonic model-theoretic logic hL;M;i, as deﬁned in Section 2.2. A possibility dis-
tribution p onM induces a possibility measure and a necessity measure on 2M, which induce values of pos-
sibility and necessity for L by the semantics. We deﬁne Necp(a) = Necp([a]) and Possp(a) = Possp([a]), for
a 2L. (Similarly, we could deﬁne Necp(A) = Necp([A]) for subsets A of L.)
We are interested in statements of the form Nec(a)P a, which we abbreviate to (a,a), where a 2L and
a 2 [0, 1]. Such a pair is called a necessity-valued formula (over L) [10]. It gives a lower bound on the degree
of support for a. We assume a set of such pairs, and we will deduce further pairs from this, implying which
elements of the language are best supported. A setA of necessity-valued formulae is called a necessity-valued
knowledge base (overL).A can be thought of as an imprecise speciﬁcation of a necessity measure, and there-
fore constrains the associated (unknown) possibility distribution p :M! ½0; 1. Possibility distribution p is
said to satisfy a necessity-valued formula (a,a) if and only if its associated necessity measure Necp satisﬁes
Necp(a)P a. We write in this case that p  (a,a). As in the usual possibilistic logic, we have a simpler char-
acterisation of this condition, which is easily proved.
Lemma 1. Possibility distribution p satisfies necessity-valued formula (a,a) if and only if p(x) 6 1  a for all
x 2M such that x 2 a.
Proof. p  (a,a) if and only if Necp(a)P a which is if and only if PosspðM ½aÞ 6 1 a which is if and only
if supfpðxÞ : x 2M ½ag 6 1 a, i.e., sup{p(x) : x 2 a} 6 1  a. This holds if and only if p(x) 6 1  a for all
x such that x 2 a. h
We say that p satisﬁes necessity-valued knowledge base A if and only if p satisﬁes each of the necessity-
valued formulae in A. The entailment relation for this possibilistic logic is deﬁned as follows: we say that
A entails pair (b,b), written A  ðb; bÞ, if and only if p  (b,b) for all p such that p A. In other words,
A  ðb; bÞ if and only if the necessity constraints corresponding to A imply that Nec(b)P b.
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fða; cÞ 2A : cP ag, the set of necessity-valued formulae whose necessity is at least a. We also deﬁne, Aa
to be the classical projection of the a-cut, so that a 2Aa if and only if there exists a pair (a,c) inA for some
cP a.
Given a necessity-valued knowledge base A we would like procedures that enable us to deduce neces-
sity-value formulae which are consequences of A. In addition, given b 2L, we would like to be able to
determine the best lower bound on the necessity of b that A implies; that is, we would like to compute
ValAðbÞ, which is deﬁned to be supfb 2 ½0; 1 :A  ðb; bÞg [10]. ValAðbÞ can be considered as the implied
necessity of b given A. We have the following key result for this possibilistic logic, which connects entail-
ment in the possibilistic logic with entailment in the underlying (e.g., linear constraints) logic, via the use of
classical projections of a-cuts.
Theorem 2. Let A be necessity-valued knowledge base over L, and b 2L.
(i) A  ðb; bÞ if and only if for all c < b, Ac  b;
(ii) if A is finite then A  ðb; bÞ ()Ab  b;
(iii) ValAðbÞ ¼ supfc :Ac  bg;
(iv) A  ðb;ValAðbÞÞ;
(v) A  ðb; bÞ if and only if b 6 ValAðbÞ.Hence for linear constraints, by ﬁnite completeness (Theorem 1), we have that ﬁnite A entails (b,b) if and
only if Ab ‘ b.
Proof. (i)(a) First assume A  ðb; bÞ, and, to prove a contradiction, suppose that there exists c < b with
Ac2b. So there exists a model x
0 with x0 Ac but x 0 2 b. Deﬁne possibility distribution p on M by
p(x 0) = 1  c, and for all x 2M fx0g, p(x) = 0. Now, p(x 0)i 1  b, so, using Lemma 1, p 2 (b,b). Consider
any ða; aÞ 2A. To prove that p  (a,a) it is suﬃcient, by Lemma 1, to show that if x 2M is such that
p(x) > 1  a then x  a. If x 2M is such that p(x) > 1  a then x = x 0, which implies that 1  c > 1  a and so
a > c; therefore a 2Ac , and so, since x0 Ac , we have x 0  a, i.e., x  a.
We have shown that p  (a,a) for all ða; aÞ 2A and therefore p A. This, together with p 2 (b,b), implies
that A2ðb; bÞ, which contradicts our initial assumption. HenceA  ðb; bÞ implies that for all c < b,Ac  b.
(i)(b) Now assume that for all c < b, Ac  b. We need to show that A  ðb; bÞ. Consider any possibility
distribution p and x 2M such that p A and any x 2 b. We will show that p(x) 6 1  b proving, by Lemma
1, that p  (b,b) and hence that A  ðb; bÞ, proving the result.
Consider any c with c < b. Since x 2 b andAc  b, we have x2Ac , so there exists ac 2Ac with x 2 ac, and
so there exists a pair (ac,a) in A for some aP c. Using the fact that p A, and hence p  (ac,a), it follows
using Lemma 1 that p(x) 6 1  a, and so p(x) 6 1  c.
Hence p(x) 6 1  c for all c < b, and so p(x) 6 s for all s > 1  b, which implies that p(x) 6 1  b, as
required.
(ii) If Ab  b then for any c < b, Ac  b (since Ac 	Ab) so, by part (i), A  ðb; bÞ.
Conversely, suppose that A is ﬁnite, and that A  ðb; bÞ. Since A is ﬁnite we can choose c such that, for
any pair (a,a) with a < b, we have a < c < b. ThenAc ¼Ab since, for ða; aÞ 2A, [aP b () aP c]. Part (i)
implies that Ac  b, i.e., Ab  b.
(iii)(a) Let b^ ¼ supfc :Ac  bg. Consider any c < b^. Then, by deﬁnition of b^, there exists c 0 such that
c < c0 6 b^ andAc0  b. SinceAc 	Ac0 this implies thatAc  b. So we have for all c < b^,Ac  b, and part
(i) implies that A  ðb; b^Þ. This proves that b^ 6 ValAðbÞ.
(iii)(b) Conversely, consider any b with b < ValAðbÞ. Choose any b 0 with b < b0 < ValAðbÞ. By deﬁnition
of ValAðbÞ, we haveA  ðb; b0Þ and so, by part (i),Ab  b. Hence b 6 supfc :Ac  bg ¼ b^. Since this holds
for any b < ValAðbÞ, we have ValAðbÞ 6 b^.
(iv) In proving (iii) we showed that A  ðb; b^Þ. Hence, by (iii), A  ðb; ValAðbÞÞ.
(v) By deﬁnition of ValAðbÞ, we have A  ðb; bÞ implies b 6 ValAðbÞ. Conversely, by (iv),
A  ðb;ValAðbÞÞ, so if b 6 ValAðbÞ then A  ðb; bÞ. h
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about the necessity degree of an element b of the languageL. Then, as in the proof of Proposition 13 of [21],
we can use a binary search over values of necessity to ﬁnd increasingly large values b 2 [0,1] withAb  b and
hence A  ðb; bÞ. Each value of b involves the checking of an inference in the language; computational eﬃ-
ciency of the procedure is therefore closely tied to the eﬃciency of deduction in the underlying logic (e.g., in
the linear constraints case, this depends on the class of linear constraints used). For the ﬁnite case, the pro-
cedure will terminate with the maximal value ValAðbÞ of b; for the case of inﬁniteA, the procedure may have
to terminate before it has found the maximal value. (However, in certain cases with inﬁnite A, analytic opti-
misation techniques can be used to compute ValAðbÞ exactly.) Of particular interest, for given b 2L, is if we
can ﬁnd b withA  ðb; bÞ butA2ð?; bÞ, as this indicates positive support for b. Focusing on the set of b with
positive support leads to a possibilistic approach to belief revision for such a monotonic model-theoretic
underlying logical language, see e.g., [12].
Note that, in contrast with [10], we allow a necessity-valued knowledge base to be inﬁnite. This is natural in
certain situations for representing continuously graded knowledge bases. Not all results for the ﬁnite case hold
for the inﬁnite case. For example, we have the following result, which is Proposition 11 of [10] in our more
general context.
For ﬁnite A we have A  ðb; bÞ if and only if Ab  ðb; bÞ. (This follows from Theorem 2(ii), since
Ab ¼ ðAbÞb.)
However, this result does not hold in general for inﬁnite A. For example, let A ¼ fða; aÞ : 0 < a < 1g,
where a is some non-tautologous element ofL (e.g., x1P 3). ThenA  ða; 1Þ. But the a-cutA1 is the empty
set, so A12ða; 1Þ.
3.2.1. Possibilistic constraints for the ﬂooded river example
We can assign necessity values to the various bounds and ﬂows in the ﬂooding problem. Our inputs then
consist of a setA of pairs (a,a) where a is a lower bound on the necessity of a, and a is either a ﬂow, a lower
bound or an upper bound.
For example, suppose a hut is observed partially submerged in compartment 49, giving us upper bound
information regarding x49, the water level in that compartment. Our expert is conﬁdent (based on the dig-
ital elevation model for the ground level, and on an estimate of the height of the hut) that the elevation of
the top of the hut is at most 120 dm (above the base level). If ‘‘conﬁdent’’ is taken to correspond to a
necessity value of 0.6, then this gives rise to a statement Nec(x49 6 120)P 0.6, and hence a necessity-val-
ued formula ((x49 6 120), 0.6). The expert tentatively believes—corresponding to necessity value 0.4—that
the top of the hut’s elevation is at most 110 dm, leading to pair ((x49 6 110), 0.4). A ﬂow is observed from
compartment 49 down to compartment 86; and this is considered as very reliable information, correspond-
ing to a necessity value of 0.9. This gives rise to the necessity-valued formula ((x86 6 x49),0.9). We can then
deduce upper bound information on the level x86 of the water in compartment 86: Nec(x86 6 120)P 0.6
and Nec(x86 6 110)P 0.4.
For any a appearing in some pair in the necessity-valued knowledge base A, we could compute, using the
linear propagation algorithm, the bounds on each compartment level xi implied from A

a. All these bounds
then have necessity value at least a. Given that A is ﬁnite, applying this approach for each a appearing in
A will then give us the implied necessity value for each inferred bound.
An alternative approach is to adapt the propagation algorithm for the constraints to also propagate the
necessities. The propagation of the bounds is based on inferences of the form: From lower bound xiP r
and ﬂow constraint xjP xi deduce lower bound xjP r. Similarly, for the possibilistic constraints, we can
chain a lower bound pair (xiP r,a) and a ﬂow pair (xjP xi,b) to get a lower bound pair (xjP r,mi-
n(a,b)). This approach generalises easily to the lattice-valued possibilistic logic and assumption-based rea-
soning approaches described in the next section. The propagation algorithms can be adapted in this way to
compute the implied necessity values of lower and upper bounds. We can also determine ?^, the deduced
necessity of ?.
The output of such an approach would be a set of upper bounds and lower bounds for each compartment
variable, where each of these bounds has an associated necessity grade, and stronger bounds are associated
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sidered as constraining the ‘best guesses’ for the water levels in the compartments. The weaker bounds, with
higher necessity values, give us information we can be more conﬁdent in.
When dealing with continuous spatial or temporal variables, it can be natural to use a continuous repre-
sentation of the uncertainty (which could be based on smooth interpolation of discrete information). For
example, an expert might indicate, using a graphical user interface, that Nec(x49 6 120  50k)P 0.6  k
for all k 2 [0, 0.6] (continuously extending the upper bound information on x49 expressed above). This gives
rise to an inﬁnite necessity-valued knowledge base: {((x49 6 120  50k),0.6  k) : k 2 [0,0.6]}.
4. Lattice-valued possibilistic logic and assumption-based reasoning
Possibilistic logic can be generalised to a situation where the values of necessity (i.e. the degrees of support)
are in a distributive lattice [9,10]; see also [12]. Degrees of support which are only partially ordered occur nat-
urally in many situations. For example, in the temporal situation described in [9], or when there are indepen-
dent sources of support with incomparable strengths. The grades of support could represent sets of scenarios;
in that case, a has generalised necessity degree of at least a if a holds in the set of scenarios represented by a.
Closely related partially ordered possibilistic logic systems (based on standard underlying logics) include those
described in [3] and in Section 2.3 of [35].
We ﬁrst consider extending lattice-valued possibilistic logic to situations where the underlying logic is more
general, that is, a monotonic model-theoretic logic hL;M;i, as deﬁned in Section 2.2. In Section 4.3 we go
on to consider a strongly related system of assumption-based reasoning.
4.1. Lattice-valued possibilistic logic
LetK ¼ ðK; 0; 1;V;WÞ be a completely distributive lattice [5], with greatest lower bound operation§ and
least upper bound operation¤ on subsets of K. The associated partial order 
 on K is given in the usual way:
a 
 b if and only if a ^ b (i.e., §{a,b}) = a.
Deﬁne the language P of this lattice-valued possibilistic logic to consist of all pairs (A,a), where A is a
subset of the language L and a 2 K is a lattice element. For example, with the linear constraints language
deﬁned in Section 2.1, set A is interpreted as meaning that the true value x of the vector of real-valued
variables satisﬁes each constraint in A. The values in the lattice K might be interpreted as truth values
(or, alternatively, degrees of preference). The interpretation of (A,a) is then: the truth value of ‘‘x satisﬁes
A’’ is at least a. Extending Standard Possibilistic Logic, we deﬁne the semantics is terms of generalised
possibility distributions. In the standard case (Section 3), possibility distribution p satisﬁes pair (A,a) if
and only if 1  p(x)P a for all x such that x 2 A. However, we do not generally have an operation cor-
responding to 1  (Æ) within the lattice. To solve this problem we deﬁne a complementary scale for the pos-
sibility values.
Let K# K* be a bijection between K and some set K*, with a* being the image of a, and deﬁne (a*)* = a.
Generalised possibility distributions p are deﬁned to be functions fromM to K*. We say p satisﬁes (A,a) if for
all x 2M such that x 2 A, (p(x))*  a. (To recover the usual deﬁnitions of possibility distribution, etc., we can
set K = [0,1] with the usual ordering, and set K* = [0,1] and a* = 1  a; cf. Lemma 1.) For D  P and
ðB; bÞ 2 P this gives the semantic consequence relation:
D  (B,b) if and only if p satisﬁes (B,b) for all p such that p satisﬁes (every pair in) D.
Theorem 2 cannot be generalised to the lattice case (at least in a simple way) because of the potentially more
complex structure of the lattice (in particular it being generally only partially ordered). However, we can still
deﬁne a very simple sound and complete proof theory.
4.2. Proof theory
From (A,a) deduce (B,b) for all (B,b) such that A  B and b 
 a.
From {(A,ai) : i 2 I} deduce (A,¤i2Iai).
From {(Ai,ai) : i 2 I} deduce (¨i2IAi,§i2Iai).
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sets C ð PÞ (which is the unique smallest set C) such that (i) C 	 D and (ii) C is closed under the inference
rules (i.e., if C contains an instance of the left-hand side of an inference rule then it contains the corre-
sponding instance of the right-hand side). We then deﬁne the syntactic consequence relation ‘ by
D ‘ (B,b) if and only if ðB; bÞ 2 CðDÞ. This leads to the following completeness result, which is proved
in Section 4.4.
Theorem 3 (Soundness and completeness of paired system). Let ðB; bÞ 2 P be a pair and let D  P be a set of
pairs. Then D  (B,b) if and only if D ‘ (B,b).
When D is ﬁnite the proof theory can be written in a simpler way, with the second and third inference rules
being replaced by
From (A,a) and (A,b) deduce (A,a _ b).
From (A,a) and (B,b) deduce (A [ B,a ^ b).
Also the deﬁnition of syntactic consequence simpliﬁes to the usual kind of deﬁnition: D ‘ (B,b) if and only
if (B,b) can be proved (in a ﬁnite number of steps) from D using the inference rules.
Even if D is inﬁnite, if distributive latticeK is ﬁnite then we can rewrite D as the equivalent, but ﬁnite, set of
pairs D 0 = {(Aa,a):a 2 K}, where, for given a 2 K, set Aa is the union of A over all (A,a) 2 D, so we again could
use the latter more usual (ﬁnitary) kind of proof theory.
Even if D is inﬁnite, if distributive latticeK is ﬁnite then we can rewrite D as the equivalent, but ﬁnite, set of
pairs D 0 = {(Aa,a) : a 2 K}, where, for given a 2 K, set Aa is the union of A over all (A,a) 2 D, so we again
could use the latter more usual (ﬁnitary) kind of proof theory.4.3. Assumption-based reasoning
We can produce a related framework and achieve similar results for systems of pairs which may be viewed
as generalised versions of assumption-based truth maintenance systems [6]. Consider a ﬁnite system of pairs of
the form (A,/) where A is a subset of the language, and / is a formula in some propositional language R;
formula / is intended to represent conditions under which constraints (or formulae) A are known to hold.
For example, if an expert tells us that x1P 120 then we can construct a pair ({x1P 120},p1), where propo-
sitional symbol p1 represents that the expert is being reliable here. To express logical relationships between
these conditions, it can be useful also to allow an additional set of formulae T  R, which are assumed to
be true.
We deﬁne the semantics for this assumption-based reasoning systems as follows. Let X be the set of R-val-
uations satisfying T. Models are deﬁned to be pairs (x,x) for x 2M and x 2 X. Pair (x,x) represents a pos-
sible assignment to the propositional variables and also a model of the languageL (which is an assignment to
all the real-valued variables in the linear constraints case). Pair (A,/) restricts possible models (x,x), and is
intended to represent that, if condition / holds, then all of A hold; we therefore say that (x,x) satisﬁes
(A,/) if the following condition holds: [x satisﬁes /] implies x  A. Hence (A,/) can be thought of as an
implication: if / holds then A holds. As usual we extend this to a semantic consequence relation on pairs:
D  (A,/) if (A,/) is satisﬁed by all (x,x) satisfying every element of D.
Deﬁne syntactic entailment ‘ using the following proof theory:
From (A,/) deduce (B,w) for all (B,w) in P such that A  B and T [ {w}  /.
From (A,/) and (A,w) deduce (A,/ _ w).
From (A,/) and (B,w) deduce (A [ B, / ^ w).
Again, this simple proof theory is sound and complete, as proved in Section 4.5.
Theorem 4 (Completeness of assumption-based system). With the above proof theory, finite D syntactically
entails (B,w) if and only if D semantically entails (B,w).
Given set of pairs D, one can associate with a set B L a formula /B in R which expresses precisely the
conditions under which B can be deduced; that is, D  (B,/) if and only if T [ {/}  /B (so that /B is a log-
ically weakest formula such that (B,/B) is deducible from D). If one had a probability measure onR, satisfying
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considered as a degree of belief in B. An important special case is where D can be written as {(Ai,pi) : i =
1, . . . ,m} where each pi is a propositional variable, and T = ;. This is an assumption-based system. If each
pi is probabilistically independent of the others, and has a chance ri of holding, this generates a probability
measure on R and hence degrees of belief. This situation corresponds to a special case of the generalised
Dempster–Shafer theory described in Section 5, and is strongly related to work on probabilistic argumentation
systems [13,1].
4.4. Proving Theorem 3
We consider a ﬁxed (possibly inﬁnite) set of pairs D  P which we label as {(Ai,ai) : i 2 I}. Deﬁne, for
x 2M, Ix = {i 2 I : x 2 Ai}. Deﬁne model pD of the lattice-valued possibilistic logic by, for x 2M,
ðpDðxÞÞ ¼
W
i2Ixai.
The ﬁrst three lemmas establish Proposition 1. Lemmas 5 and 6 then establish Proposition 2; the complete-
ness property follows immediately from these two propositions. Soundness follows from Lemma 7.
Lemma 2. pD satisfies (A,a) if and only if for all x 2 A,
W
i2Ixai  a.
Proof. pD satisﬁes (A,a) if and only if for all x 2M such that x 2 A, (pD(x))*  a, i.e.,
W
i2Ixai  a. h
Lemma 3. Model p satisfies D if and only if for all x 2M, ðpðxÞÞ  Wi2Ixai, i.e., (p(x))*  (pD(x))*.
Proof. Suppose ﬁrst that p satisﬁes D. Then p satisﬁes (Ai,ai) for any i 2 I. So, for all x 2M we have
(p(x))*  ai if x 2 Ai, i.e., if i 2 Ix. Hence ðpðxÞÞ 
W
i2Ixai.
Conversely, suppose that for all x 2M, ðpðxÞÞ  Wi2Ixai. If x 2 Ai then i 2 Ix, so (p(x))*  ai, which shows
that p satisﬁes every element (Ai,ai) of D, as required. h
Lemma 4. pD satisfies D.
Proof. This follows immediately from Lemma 3. h
Proposition 1. If D  (B,b) then ðVx2B
W
i2IxaiÞ  b.
Proof. Suppose D  (B,b). Lemma 4 implies that pD satisﬁes (B,b), so for all x 2 B,
W
i2Ixai  b, by Lemma 2.
Hence b is a lower bound for the inﬁmum of these, i.e.,
V
x2B
W
i2Ixai  b. h
For an arbitrary subset B of L, let SB = {r  I : ¨i2rAi  B}.
Lemma 5. For any B L, CðDÞ contains the pair B;Wr2SB
V
i2rai
 
.
Proof. For any r  I, we have that CðDÞ contains {(Ai,ai) : i 2 r}. So by the third inference rule, CðDÞ con-
tains (¨i2rAi,§i2rai). Therefore, if r 2 SB then CðDÞ contains (B,§i2rai), using the ﬁrst inference rule. Hence,
by the second inference rule, CðDÞ contains B;Wr2SB
V
i2rai
 
, as required. h
Lemma 6. For any B L, Wr2SB
V
i2rai is equal to
V
x2B
W
i2Ixai.
Proof. A lattice is said to be completely distributive if for any doubly indexed set {ar,s : r 2 R, s 2 S},^
r2R
_
s2S
ar;s ¼
_
e:R!S
^
r2R
ar;eðrÞ;where the ¤ on the right-hand side is over all functions e from R to S.
Let R ¼M ½B ¼ fx 2M : x 2 Bg, let S = I, and deﬁne ax,i = ai if i 2 Ix (i.e., if x 2 Ai), and, otherwise, let
ax,i = 0, the minimum element of the lattice. Applying the completely distributive property gives
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x2R
_
i2I
ax;i ¼
_
e:R!I
^
x2R
ax;eðxÞ:Now,^
x2R
_
i2I
ax;i ¼
^
x2B
_
i2Ix
ai;since elements 0 can be omitted from an application of ¤. Also,_
e:R!I
^
x2R
ax;eðxÞ ¼
_
e:R!I
8x;eðxÞ2Ix
^
x2R
aeðxÞ;because we need only consider functions e such that for all x 2 R, e(x) 2 Ix, since other functions e just give
rise to an element 0, which can be omitted from the application of ¤. Using idempotence of § and ¤, this
last term can be written as¤r2Qar, where Q is a particular set of subsets of I, and for r  I, we deﬁne ar to be
§i2rai. A set r is in Q if and only if there exists some function e : R! I such that e(x) 2 Ix for all x 2 R, and
r = {e(x) : x 2 R}. Putting these parts together we have that Vx2B
W
i2Ixai is equal to ¤r2Qar. Hence, to com-
plete the proof, we just have to show that
W
r2Qar ¼
W
r2SBar.
We will ﬁrst show that Q  SB which implies that
W
r2Qar 

W
r2SBar. Consider any r 2 Q. Then for any
x 2 B, there exists an element j = e(x) 2 r with j 2 Ix, i.e., x 2 Aj and hence x 2 ¨i2rAi; this proves that
¨i2rAi  B and hence r 2 SB, as required.
We will now show that for any r 2 SB there exists an element r 0 2 Q with r 0  r, and hence ar0  ar, this
proves that
W
r2SBar 

W
r2Qar, and hence
W
r2Qar ¼
W
r2SBar.
Consider any r 2 SB. By deﬁnition of SB, for any x 2 B, we have x 2 ¨i2rAi, so there exists ix 2 r such that
x2Aix . Deﬁne function e : R! I by for all x 2 R, e(x) = ix, which is in Ix, and let r 0 = {e(x) : x 2 R}. By
construction, r 0 2 Q and r 0  r. h
Proposition 2. If ðVx2B
W
i2IxaiÞ  b then CðDÞ contains the pair (B,b).
Proof. Lemmas 5 and 6 immediately imply that CðDÞ contains the pair ðB;Vx2B
W
i2IxaiÞ. If ð
V
x2B
W
i2IxaiÞ  b
then, by the ﬁrst inference rule, CðDÞ contains the pair (B,b). h
Lemma 7. Let p be any function from M to K*. Then
(i) if p satisfies (A,a), and (B,b) is such that A  B and b 
 a then p satisfies (B,b);
(ii) if p satisfies each of {(A,ai) : i 2 I} then p satisfies (A,¤i2Iai);
(iii) if p satisfies each of {(Ai,ai) : i 2 I} then p satisfies (¨i2IAi,§i2Iai).
Proof.
(i) Suppose that p satisﬁes (A,a), and (B,b) is such that A  B and b 
 a. Consider any x 2M such
that x 2 B. Therefore x 2 A, and so (p(x))*  a  b and hence (p(x))*  b, proving that p satisﬁes
(B,b).
(ii) Suppose that p satisﬁes each of {(A,ai) : i 2 I}. Consider any x 2M such that x 2 A. Then for all i 2 I,
(p(x))*  ai, so (p(x))* ¤i2Iai, showing that p satisﬁes (A,¤i2Iai).
(iii) Suppose that p satisﬁes each of {(Ai,ai) : i 2 I}. Consider any x 2M such that x 2 ¨i2IAi. So there exists
some i 2 I such that x 2 Ai, which implies that (p(x))*  ai and so (p(x))* §i2Iai, proving that p sat-
isﬁes (¨i2IAi,§i2Iai). h
Proof of Theorem 3. Soundness: Let C0ðDÞ be the semantic consequences of D, i.e., the set of all pairs (B,b)
such that D  (B,b). To prove soundness, it is suﬃcient to show that C0ðDÞ contains D and is closed under the
inference rules, as this implies C0ðDÞ 	 CðDÞ, and hence D ‘ (B,b) implies D  (B,b).
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C0ðDÞ contains (B,b) and hence contains D.
(2) Suppose C0ðDÞ contains (A,a), and that B and b are such that A  B and b 
 a. Consider any p such that
p satisﬁes D, so p satisﬁes (A,a). Lemma 7 then implies that p satisﬁes (B,b), and so D  (B,b) proving
that C0ðDÞ is closed under the ﬁrst inference rule. Similarly, Lemma 7 implies that C0ðDÞ is closed under
the second two inference rules. h
Completeness: Suppose D  (B,b). By Proposition 1, ðVx2B
W
i2IxaiÞ  b. Hence by Proposition 2, CðDÞ con-
tains the pair (B,b), as required.
4.5. Proving Theorem 4
One might prove Theorem 4 using the results of the last section. Here, however, we give a direct proof. We
consider again a ﬁxed set of pairs D, which we write as {(Ai,/i) : i 2 I}, where I is ﬁnite, since we are assuming
that D is ﬁnite. For an arbitrary subset B of L, we let SB = {r  I : ¨i2rAi  B}.
The completeness part of the proof follows using the ﬁrst two lemmas; soundness follows from Lemma 10.
Lemma 8. For any B L, D syntactically entails ðB;Wr2SB
V
i2r/iÞ.
Proof. The proof of this is very similar to that for Lemma 5. Consider any r 2 SB. Since r is ﬁnite, we can
repeatedly apply the third inference rule, to show that D syntactically entails (¨i2rAi,§i2r/i). Since r 2 SB,
we have ¨i2rAi  B, so we can use the ﬁrst inference rule to show that D syntactically entails (B,§i2r/i).
Hence, by repeated application of the second inference rule, D syntactically entails B;
W
r2SB
V
i2rai
 
, as
required. h
Lemma 9. If D semantically entails (B,w) then T [ fwg  Wr2SB
V
i2r/i.
Proof. Suppose that D semantically entails (B,w), and consider any x 2 X such that x satisﬁes w. It is suﬃ-
cient to show that x satisﬁes
W
r2SB
V
i2r/i.
Consider any x 2M such that x 2 B. Then (x,x) does not satisfy (B,w), so (x,x) does not satisfy D, by the
deﬁnition of semantic consequence in the paired system. Hence there exists some ix 2 I such that (x,x) does
not satisfy ðAix ;/ixÞ, i.e., x satisﬁes /ix but x2Aix .
Deﬁne rx ¼ fix : x 2M; x 2 Bg. If x 2M is such that x 2 B then x2Aix (as shown above) and so x2
S
i2rxAi,
which proves that
S
i2rxAi  B, and hence that rx 2 SB. For all i 2 rx, we have that x satisﬁes /i, so x satisﬁesV
i2rx/i and hence x satisﬁes
W
r2SB
V
i2r/i, as required. h
Lemma 10. Consider an arbitrary pair (x,x) with x 2M and x 2 X.
(i) If (x,x) satisfies (A,/) then (x,x) satisfies (B,w) if A  B and T [ {w}  /.
(ii) If (x,x) satisfies (A,/) and (A,w) then (x,x) satisfies (A,/ _ w).
(iii) If (x,x) satisfies (A,/) and (B,w) then (x,x) satisfies (A [ B,/ ^ w).
Proof.
(i) Suppose (x,x) satisﬁes (A,/) and A  B and T [ {w}  /. If x satisﬁes w then x satisﬁes /, which
implies that x  A (since (x,x) satisﬁes (A,/)). Hence x  B, proving that (x,x) satisﬁes (B,w).
(ii) Suppose that (x,x) satisﬁes (A,/) and (A,w). If x satisﬁes / _ w then either x satisﬁes / and so x  A,
or x satisﬁes w and so also then x  A. This proves that (x,x) satisﬁes (A,/ _ w).
(iii) Suppose that (x,x) satisﬁes (A,/) and (B,w). If x satisﬁes / ^ w then x satisﬁes / and hence x  A, and
also, x satisﬁes w and so x  B. Therefore x  A [ B proving that (x,x) satisﬁes (A [ B,/ ^ w). h
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Suppose ﬁrst that D syntactically entails (B,w). Consider any pair (x,x) satisfying D. Using Lemma 10, and
by induction on the length of the proof, it follows that (x,x) satisﬁes (B,w). This proves that D semantically
entails (B,w).
Now, conversely, suppose that D semantically entails (B,w), and so by Lemma 9, T [ fwg  Wr2SB
V
i2r/i.
Lemma 8 tells us that D syntactically entails ðB;Wr2SB
V
i2r/iÞ, so we can apply the ﬁrst inference rule, showing
that D syntactically entails (B,w). h
5. Extending Dempster–Shafer theory
This section shows howDempster–Shafer theory can be extended to reason with linear constraints, and to the
othermonotonic logic formalismsweconsider. See [19] for a somewhat relatedapproach toDempster–Shafer the-
ory for spatial and temporal reasoning, and [4,18] for other work on generalising Dempster–Shafer theory to
logics.
Dempster–Shafer theory, with the view taken here, can be considered as representing situations where we
have a probability distribution over a set, and a logical relation between the set and the propositions of inter-
est. For example, in the ﬂooded river problem, one such situation is if we have a probability distribution over
the height of a vine, and the vine is only partially covered by the water, implying that the water level there is
below the top of the vine. The probabilistic and logical information together can be used to generate degrees of
belief in propositions of interest.
5.1. Basic deﬁnitions of Dempster–Shafer theory
The formalism of [27] was derived from that of [8]; Dempster’s framework is more convenient for our pur-
poses, and we describe the mathematical basics of a slight variant of it (see [32]).
Let H be a set, which is interpreted as a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive propositions, or as a set of
‘possible worlds’. H is known as a frame [of discernment]. The propositions of interest are all assumed to be
expressed as subsets of the frame. An uncertain piece of information regardingH is represented as a source triple
overH, which is deﬁned to be a triple (X,P,C) whereX is a set,P is a strictly positive probability distribution over
X (so that for allx 2 X,P(x)5 0) andC is a function fromX to 2H  {;}. Sowehave probabilistic informationP
about another setX, which is related toH by C. Mapping C expresses a logical connection between X andH: for
x 2 X, C(x) is the set of elements ofH which are compatible with x. Associated with a source triple S is a belief
function BelS : 2
H! [0,1] giving ‘‘degrees of belief’’ in subsets of the frame. We deﬁne BelS(X) =
P{x : C(x)  X}, which is the probability that random set C(x) is a subset of X. BelS(X) can be thought of as
the probability that X is implied by the piece of uncertain information represented by the source triple. Belief
functions are intended as representations of subjective degrees of belief, as described in [27,28].
Suppose we have a number of source triples over H each representing a separate piece of uncertain infor-
mation. The combined eﬀect of these, given the appropriate independence assumptions, is calculated using
Dempster’s rule (of combination). The result of applying Dempster’s rule to a ﬁnite set of source triples
{(Xi,Pi,Ci), for i = 1, . . . ,k}, is deﬁned to be the source triple (X,PDS,C) over H, which is deﬁned as follows.
Let X· = X1 ·    · Xk. For x 2 X·, x(i) is deﬁned to be its ith component, so that x = (x(1), . . . ,x(k)). Deﬁne
C 0 : X·! 2H by C0ðxÞ ¼ Tki¼1CiðxðiÞÞ and probability distribution P 0 on X· by P 0ðxÞ ¼
Qk
i¼1P iðxðiÞÞ, for
x 2 X·. Let X be the set {x 2 X·:C 0(x)5 ;}, let C be C 0 restricted to X, and let probability function PDS
on X be P 0 conditioned on X, so that for x 2 X, PDS(x) = P 0(x)/P 0(X).
The combined measure of belief Bel over H is thus given, for X  H, by Bel(X) = PDS({x 2 X : C(x)  X}).
5.2. Generalising Dempster–Shafer theory to other logics
We consider an underlying monotonic model-theoretic logic hL;M;i, as deﬁned in Section 2.2. The def-
initions of the previous section can be extended easily to such logical languages via the semantics. Essentially,
the belief of A L is deﬁned to be the belief of [A].
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function (i.e., probability density function or probability mass function) on X and C is a function from X
to F, where F is the set of ﬁnite2 consistent subsets of L. One interpretation of source triples is that we’re
interested inL, but we have Bayesian beliefs about X, and a logical connection between the two, expressed by
C. The interpretation of C is that if the proposition represented by x is true, then the proposition represented
by C(x) is also true.
We can associate with a source triple S = (X,P,C) over L a generalised belief function BelS :L! ½0; 1
giving degrees of belief in elements in the language L. This is given as follows: for a 2L,
BelS(a) = P({x 2 X : C(x)  a}) (assuming that this set is measurable), which we abbreviate to P(C(x)  a);
the belief in a is the probability that a is implied. We can also deﬁne Bel for ﬁnite subsets A ofL in a similar
fashion: BelS(A) = P(C(x)  A).
Source triple S = (X,P,C) over L corresponds to a source triple S0 = (X,P,C0) over the set of modelsM
(as deﬁned in the last section), where C0 : X! 2M is given by, for x 2 X, C0(x) = [C(x)]. As one would hope,
we then have, for A L, BelSðAÞ ¼ BelS0ð½AÞ.
Dempster’s rule of combination
Dempster’s rule of combination can also be easily extended. Suppose we have a number of source triples
(Xi,Pi,Ci), for i = 1, . . . ,k, each representing a separate piece of uncertain information. The combination
(X,PDS,C) of these source triples over L is deﬁned as follows.
As in the last section, let X· = X1 ·    · Xk. Deﬁne C0 : X !F by C0ðxÞ ¼
Sk
i¼1CiðxðiÞÞ and probability
function P 0 on X· by P 0ðxÞ ¼ Qki¼1P iðxðiÞÞ, for x 2 X·. Let X be the set {x 2 X· : [C 0(x)]5 ;}, let C be C 0
restricted to X, and let probability function PDS on X be P 0 conditioned by X, so that for x 2 X,
PDS(x) = P 0(x)/P 0(X) (given that P 0(X)5 0).
The combined measure of belief Bel is the belief function associated with the combined source triple, and is
thus given, for ﬁnite A L, by Bel(A) = PDS(C(x)  A). For the linear constraints case, by Theorem 1, this
equals PDS(C(x) ‘ A) since C(x) is a ﬁnite subset of L.
Computing combined belief
It is possible to adapt some of the standard approaches (see e.g., [32]) for computing combined belief in this
more general situation. In particular, various Monte-Carlo algorithms can be adapted to give arbitrarily close
approximations of values of belief. We assume that we have some procedure for determining whether
C(x)  A holds or not.
Since, for ﬁnite A L, Bel(A) = PDS(C(x)  A), to calculate Bel(A) we can repeat a large number of trials
of a Monte-Carlo algorithm where for each trial, we pick x with chance PDS(x) and say that the trial succeeds
if C(x)  A, and fails otherwise. Bel(A) is then estimated by the proportion of the trials that succeed. The most
straight-forward way is to pick x with chance PDS(x) by repeatedly (if necessary) picking x 2 X· with chance
P 0(x) until we get an x in X. Picking x with chance P 0(x) is easy: for each i = 1, . . . ,k, we pick xi 2 Xi with
chance Pi(xi) and let x = (x1, . . . ,xk). If the conﬂict probability 1  P 0(X) is bounded away from 1, this algo-
rithm has low complexity, proportional to the complexity of proof in the logic [31,32], but with a high constant
factor because of needing a large number of trials to achieve a good estimate of values of belief. If the conﬂict
is very high, we would be better oﬀ using more complex Monte-Carlo algorithms, such as a Markov chain
Monte-Carlo algorithm [22,32].
5.2.1. Dempster–Shafer approach for the ﬂooded river example
An uncertain ﬂow constraint xjP xi with reliability p 2 [0, 1] can be represented as a source triple
({x,x 0},P,C) over a linear constraints language L (see Section 2.1), with P(x) = p, P(x 0) = 1  p and
C(x) = {xjP xi}, and C(x 0) = {>}. This corresponds to a simple support function [27]. Given just this source
triple, we can deduce the constraint xjP xi with chance p, so that the associated belief function has
Bel({xjP xi}) = p.2 We restrict to ﬁnite subsets so that for the linear constraints case, we can make use of the ﬁnite completeness result, Theorem 1. This
restriction could be relaxed.
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information from a digital elevation model and an observation that this compartment is ﬂooded, which is rep-
resented by a source triple ({x1,x2,x3},P2,C2) deﬁned as follows: P2(x1) = 0.5, P2(x2) = 0.4 and
P2(x3) = 0.1; and C2(x1) = (x2P 100), C2(x2) = (x2P 90), and C2(x3) = >. This leads to a belief function
with Bel(x2P 100) = 0.5 (arising from a judgement that there is 50% chance that the elevation of this com-
partment is at least 100), and Bel(x2P 90) = 0.5 + 0.4 = 0.9. If we had just this source triple and an uncertain
ﬂow constraint x8P x2 with reliability 0.95, then the combined belief that x8P 100 would be equal to
0.5 · 0.95 = 0.475. Note that a continuously graded representation of an uncertain bound can also be very
natural, which requires the use of inﬁnite X in the source triple; Monte-Carlo simulation can be still used
for computation.
Given a large number of uncertain ﬂow constraints and uncertain upper and lower bounds, we can repre-
sent each by source triples and combine them using Dempster’s rule, given that the appropriate independence
assumptions are satisﬁed. (It is also possible to model dependencies in the information, by constructing a dif-
ferent combined probability function from PDS.) We can then compute the combined beliefs in constraints of
interest, or use a Monte-Carlo algorithm to approximate them. For example, if we ﬁnd that
Bel({x6P 120,x6 6 130}) = 0.7 then it means that with chance 0.7 we can deduce that the level of compart-
ment 6 is in the interval [120,130]; the value 0.7 can be viewed as a kind of lower probability for:
x6 2 [120,130].
6. Summary
This paper shows how a number of important uncertainty formalisms can be extended to deal with uncer-
tain linear constraints, and other logical formalisms. The formalisms we discuss are possibilistic logic, a lattice-
valued possibilistic logic, a general form of assumption-based reasoning, and Dempster–Shafer theory. We
show how deductions can be made in this possibilistic logic, and how Dempster–Shafer algorithms can be
adapted, and construct sound and complete proof theories for the lattice-valued possibilistic logic, and the
assumption-based reasoning formalism.
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